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THE BOTTOM LINE CONCEPT IN EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LAW
ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN*
The prohibition on employment discrimination in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964' produced major social reform in the 1970's.
The enforcement, of the statute2 and of Executive Order 11,246, pro-
scribing discrimination by government contractors,3 virtually elimi-
nated the deliberate and open restriction of job opportunities because
of race, national origin, and sex that had been characteristic of the pre-
Civil Rights Act era.4 But Title VII reached far beyond purposeful dis-
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dures, Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, and Affirmative Action Guide-
lines; Consultant intermittently since 1967 to the United States Departments of Labor, Justice,
Housing & Urban Development, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, state and local
human rights agencies; advisor to private parties in equal employment matters, 1973-77; author,
Black Employment and the Law (1971), and law review essays; labor arbitrator since 1957; Acting
Dean, Rutgers Law School, 1974-75. The views expressed herein are those of the author, and not
necessarily those of any government agency.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)). Title VII makes it
unlawful for an employer or labor organization, or an employment agency, or a joint labor-man-
agement committee controlling apprenticeship or training to engage in discrimination against an
individual in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Pub. L. No.
88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 255 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976)).
2. Originally the Act applied only to private employers. Title VII is administered primarily
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter referred to as EEOC], which was
given only the power to investigate and conciliate claims of discrimination against private employ-
ers in 1964. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705, 78 Stat. 258 (1964). It was called a "poor enfeebled thing"
by one scholar. M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
205 (1965). In 1972, Congress authorized EEOC to bring suit in federal court against private
parties. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5, 86 Stat. 107 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) (1976)).
Public employers were brought under the Act in 1972. At that time they became subject to
investigation and conciliation by EEOC, but only the Attorney General could bring suits in fed-
eral court. Id. § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976)).
3. In addition to the Title VII prohibitions on employment discrimination, employers who
are government contractors are prohibited from discriminating and are required to take affirma-
tive action to assure equal employment opportunity under Executive Order 11,246, which is ad-
ministered by the Department of Labor, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs. Exec.
Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 169 (1974), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1232 (1976).
4. For example, the textile industry was widely noted in the 1960's for exclusion of blacks.
In 1967, the EEOC conducted a Textile Employment Forum to present data about hiring practices
at textile mills in North and South Carolina. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMIS-
SION, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 21-24 (1968). In 1966, textile companies reported a total of
1
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crimination.' The 1971 Supreme Court decision in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.6 established the principle that proof of purpose or intent to
discriminate is unnecessary to establish a violation of the Act where the
business practice has a disparate effect on minorities or women-in that
case, an educational standard and passage of a written examination-
and is not shown to be job-related.7
779,620 employees of whom 61,672 were black (7.9%). EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COM-
MISSION, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY REPORT No. I: JOB PATTERNS FOR MINORITIES
AND WOMEN IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY - 1966, pt. 1, A-I (1968) [hereinafter cited as EEOC REPORT
No. I]. In 1978, the industry reported a total of 754,296 employees of whom 176,489 were black
(23.4%). EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, I EEOC 1978 REPORT: MINORITIES
AND WOMEN IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY 1-19 (1980) [hereinafter cited as I EEOC 1978 REPORT]. The
same sources indicate that the participation of black white collar workers in the textile industry
rose from 1.0% in 1966 to 5.5% in 1978. The trucking industry was also the subject of early Title
VII enforcement efforts. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977). In 1966, 0.8% of the white collar workers in motor freight transportation and storage were
black. EEOC REPORT No. 1, supra note 4, at A-2. In 1978, 5.5% of the white collar workers in the
industry were black. I EEOC 1978 REPORT, supra note 4, at 1-93.
5. Prior to 1965, discrimination was understood as an individual act based on a purpose
or motive to subordinate all members of a class, defined by race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin. Blacks belong in their place, therefore any black seeking employment will be
assigned only to "black" jobs or not hired at all. Women belong "in the home," and will be
given "women's work" or nothing. This "evil motive" test of discrimination made proof of
violation virtually impossible. A second text of discrimination--equal treatment-was also
applied. If similarly situated blacks and whites or men and women applied, and the white or
male was preferred by the employer this would be, or be evidence of, discrimination. This
test permitted the employer to rely on subordination of minorities or women in other areas of
life as a reason for denying them employment opportunities. Under this test, an employer
could impose an educational level requirement, although minorities as a class had less educa-
tion; a test requirement, although minorities fared less well on written tests; a "no arrest"
requirement, although minorities in metropolitan areas were more frequently arrested than
whites; or a work experience requirement which ignored forms of experience that many wo-
men had.
Early in the administration of Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
adopted a third test of discrimination, one based on effect rather than the motive of the em-
ployer. This was first done in connection with the question of employment tests. The EEOC
rules [sic] that a test which had an adverse effect on minority employment opportunity was
illegal unless justified by business necessity. The "effect test" was thereafter used by the
agency and the lower courts to invalidate "word of mouth" recruiting; to set aside departmen-
tal or other seniority units; and to upset traditional hiring hall arrangements in the construc-
tion industry when they perpetuated racial discrimination. In 1971, the Supreme Court, in
the keystone opinion in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., upheld the use of the effect test.
Blumrosen & Blumrosen, Layoff or Work-Sharing The Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the Recession of
1975, 1 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L.J. 2, 4-5 (1975).
6. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
7. "[Tjhe Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited." Id. at 431. "[Plractices, procedures or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices." Id. at 430.
"[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or
testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in head winds' for minority groups and are unrelated to
measuring job capability." Id. at 432. "The Company's lack of discriminatory intent is suggested
by special efforts to help the undereducated employees through Company financing of two-thirds
the cost of tuition for high school training. But Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
2
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As a result, many employers began to include minorities and women
in jobs that had been the preserve of the white male.8 Virtually every
major employer in the private sector refined and revised employment
practices that were once considered a normal part of industrial rela-
tions.9 Both in human terms and in statistical terms, the nation's work
force was "more equal" by the end of the decade.'"
Most impressive were statistics showing that minorities had signifi-
cantly increased their participation in the job categories of officials and
managers, professional and technical workers, and that the proportion
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Id. See generally Blumrosen,
Strangers in Paradise- Griggs v, Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination,
71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972).
The courts have not yet clearly defined in statistical terms what constitutes an adverse effect or
impact. Where employment practices are facially neutral, statistics are probative to show a dis-
proportionate effect on a class protected by the statute. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures - 1978 adopt a "4/Sths" or "eighty per cent" rule as a practical means of
determining adverse impact. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures - 1978, 29
C.F.R. § 1607.4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as UGESP - 1978]. See text accompanying notes 84-92
infra for a discussion of this rule. (In cases of disparate treatment where, unlike disparate "im-
pact" situations, discriminatory motive or intent must be shown, statistics may also be used to
make out a prima facie case of discrimination. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 (1977)).
Once a prima facie case of discrimination has been established by the plaintiff, the burden shifts
to the employer to show that there is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an applicant's
rejection (individual suit) or for the low number of minorities hired or promoted (pattern or prac-
tice suit). Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772-73 (1976).
8. For examples of increases in black employment, see note 4 supra. With respect to em-
ployment of women in the "executive suite," in 1966, 0.5% of officials and managers in the textile
industry were women. EEOC REPORT No. 1, supra note 4, at F-4. By 1978, 5,073 of 54,957 textile
officials and managers were women (9.2%). 1 EEOC 1978 REPORT, supra note 4, at 1-19. Other
examples of changes in female participation rates as officials and managers include fabricated
metal products industry, 0.7% in 1966, and 5.1% in 1978; transportation equipment, 0.5% in 1966,
and 3.5% in 1978; and food and kindred products, 0.8% in 1966, and 6.8% in 1978. For 1966
figures, see EEOC REPORT No. 1, supra note 4, at F-4, and for 1978 figures, see I EEOC 1978
REPORT, supra note 4, at 1-57, -81, -11.
9. The basic employment practice affected by Title VII was the restriction of access to jobs
by race or sex. Before Title VII, "black" jobs and "white" jobs, "men's" jobs and "women's" jobs
were openly recognized. Some of the other discriminatory employment practices include giving
misleading or incomplete information to blacks (see, e.g., United States v. Central Motor Lines,
Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.C. 1971)); refusing to hire applicants who had arrest records (see,
e.g., Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972)); applying a hiring or retention
standard to one sex but not to the other (see, e.g., Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of America, 337 F.
Supp. 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1972)); and allowing men to work longer hours than women (see, e.g.,
Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972)). For an extensive discus-
sion of other illegal practices, see L. MODJEsKA, HANDLING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
CASES §§ 1.11-.17 (1980).
10. For example, from 1954 to 1979, the labor force participation rate of women rose from
33.9% to 46.3%. WOMEN'S BUREAU, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T. OF
LABOR, THE EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 1 (1975). For further statistics, see R.
Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12
MICH. J. L. REF. 397, 402-10 (1979). New statistical measures have been developed. See CoM-
MISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL INDICATORS OF EQUALITY FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN 28-
46 (1978).
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of minority high school graduates entering college matched that of
white youth.I Thus, one of the three traditional indicia of discrimina-
tion 2--occupational distribution-showed marked improvement dur-
ing the decade. The other traditional indicators-relative
unemployment rates and family income differences-remained largely
unchanged.' 3 Therefore, it could be said that the law, through the op-
eration of the Griggs principle, opened promotional opportunities to
minorities and women in the 1970's. In the eighties, I believe it will
shift attention to those practices which contribute to the income and
unemployment differentials. 4
There will be another marked difference between the seventies and
the eighties in this field: the emergence of a new legal principle that is
contemporaneously thought of as "the bottom line." This principle
means that the law will "let alone" those employers whose practices
produce an acceptable number of minorities and women in various job
categories.' 5 The right of an employer to approach "the bottom line"
11. For example, in 1966, EEOC found in its national survey that 14,000 black males held
positions as officials and managers, while 1,917,000 white males were so employed (total employ-
ment reported to EEOC by Title VII employers was 26,000,000). EEOC REPORT No. 1, supra
note 4, at 1, 9. In 1978, with a data base of 32,708,421 employees, there were 2,760,584 white male
officers and managers and 177,408 black male officers and managers. I EEOC 1978 REPORT,
supra note 4, at I- 1. Thus, the black proportion of the total in this occupation group increased
from less than 1% in 1966 to 6% in 1978.
12. These three indicia of discrimination-occupational distribution, relative unemployment
rates, and family income differences-have long been used to define the economic consequences
of discrimination. Prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act, blacks were concentrated in the
worst paying and least stable job classifications, black unemployment rates were double those of
whites, and annual income of blacks was less than 60% that of whites with comparable age, educa-
tion, and experience. See Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense and Law in Labor Relations, 27
RUTGERS L. REV. 675, 681-82 (1974). See also H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. 2, reprinted
in [1964] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2391; R. Blumrosen, supra note 10, at 409.
13. In 1978, the Civil Rights Commission stated that "women and minority males are more
likely to be unemployed . . . . With regard to income, minorities and women have less per capita
household income; lower earnings; [and] smaller annual increases in earnings with age ...."
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL INDICATORS OF EQUALITY FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN
86 (1978). See R. Blumrosen, supra note 10, at 410.
14. Neither the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1976)), nor Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)), have "been applied to the question of wage rates paid for
jobs into which minorities and women have been traditionally segregated." R. Blumrosen, supra
note 10, at 399.
Consequently, the major problem confronting women at work and an important problem
confronting minorities-the relatively low pay rates for jobs which have been traditionally
reserved for women or minorities as compared to rates paid for work traditionally performed
by males or whites-has not been addressed at all by federal anti-discrimination laws.
1d. at 400.
During the week of May 3, 1980, the EEOC conducted three days of hearings to investigate the
causes of wage gaps between women and men and to decide if this pattern of discrimination can
be prosecuted under Title VII.
15. The UGESP - 1978 recognizes that an employee selection procedure which has no ad-
verse impact on protected groups does not violate Title VII or the Executive Order. If "[a] selec-
tion rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group. . . is less than four-fifths ((4/5) or (eighty per cent)) of
4
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without risking liability under a "reverse discrimination" claim was up-
held in 1979 by the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers v. Weber. 6
Just as the seventies were dominated by the Griggs decision, so, I
believe, the eighties will be dominated by radiations from the Weber
decision. That decision protects employer programs which increase the
proportion of minorities through race specific action against a claim of
reverse discrimination. Just as Griggs adopted a principle known as
"adverse impact" to help identify discriminatory practices, so the
Weber case supports another principle, known as the "bottom line," to
help improve the employment position of minorities and women. This
principle will permit a direct attack on social indicators of job discrimi-
nation: the higher unemployment rate, the lower occupational status,
and the lower income levels of minorities and women. 7 It will also
lead to reduced governmental regulation of employers who apply the
principle. 8
The purpose of this article is to explore the development of the "bot-
tom line" principle and to suggest some of its applications in the 1980's.
THE THEORY OF THE "BOTTOM LINE"
The premise behind the "bottom line" principle is that Congress in-
tended to increase employment opportunities for minorities and wo-
men and thereby to improve their economic and social status.' 9 The
"bottom line" principle protects employers who improve employment
opportunities from "direct" discrimination claims by minorities and
the rate for the group with the highest rate, [it] will generally be regarded by Federal enforcement
agencies as evidence of adverse impact. A greater rate generally will not be regarded as evidence
of adverse impact. UGESP - 1978, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D (1978). For a discussion of this rule, see
note 7 supra & text accompanying notes 84-92 infra.
However, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, governmental agencies enforcing anti-discrim-
ination laws in the employment field will take into account the "general posture of the [employer]
with respect to equal employment opportunity" (ie., the bottom line). UGESP - 1978, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.4E (1978). Section 4C provides that an employer with an acceptable over-all record for
employment of minorities and women will probably be free from government initiation of pro-
ceedings under the statute or executive order, notwithstanding that there was an adverse impact
found in one component of the selection process. However, an affected individual could still pur-
sue his or her remedies. UGESP - 1978, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4C (1978).
16. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See text accompanying notes 27-34 infra for a discussion of the
Weber decision.
17. For a complete discussion of how these social indicators can be attacked by the "bottom
line" principle, see Blumrosen, supra note 12.
18. See note 15 supra.
19. [11t was clear to Congress that "[tihe crux of the problem [was] to open employment
opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them,"...
and it was to this problem that Title VIl's prohibition against racial discrimination in em-
ployment was primarily addressed.
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203 (1979). See also, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 328 (1977).
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women2 ° and from "reverse" discrimination claims by white males.2'
This protection may take the form of (a) a complete defense against
discrimination claims,2 2 (b) a decision by administrative agencies not to
proceed against such an employer,23 (c) a factor to be taken into ac-
count in favor of an employer in a discrimination suit against it by a
minority or female,24 or (d) a basis for denying injunctive relief.25
Thus, the "bottom line" theory, like Griggs, is grounded in the inten-
tion of Congress to improve the status of minorities and women in em-
ployment. Griggs was the stick, threatening an employer with a finding
of illegality, an injunction, and financial consequences if his business
practices perpetuate the inferior status of minorities and women. "Bot-
tom line" is the carrot, rewarding the employer whose practices "mir-
ror" the congressional purpose. Both the Griggs theory and the
"bottom line" theory are legal doctrines in the service of the congres-
sional purpose. Just as Griggs required a decade of judicial interpreta-
tion and adaptation by industry and labor, so, too, the "bottom line"
concept will require a decade of implementation and judicial-adminis-
trative elaboration.26
THE "BOTTOM LINE" IN THE SUPREME COURT
Weber is the most recent case to interpret Title VII in furtherance of
the congressional purpose to improve the employment status of minori-
ties and women.27 In Weber, a white employee challenged a training
program for skilled jobs which reserved fifty per cent of the places in
the program for minorities. This challenge arose in a context where
20. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Hazelwood School Dist.
v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
21. After the passage of Title VII lent new urgency to compliance with the provisions of
Executive Order 11,246, many employers began affirmative action programs to achieve equal em-
ployment opportunity. Some of these programs were challenged in "reverse" discrimination suits
because they took into account sex, race, or national origin, which are prohibited by Title VII.
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 255 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976)). See, e.g., United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Contractor's Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d
159 (3rd Cir. 1971); Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 357 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Cal.
1972); Hiatt v. City of Berkeley, 10 F.E.P. 251 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1975).
22. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
23. UGESP - 1978, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4C (1978).
24. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
25. In County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979), an effective affirmative action
program was held to moot out a Title VII claim for injunctive relief. Parham v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), also denied injunctive relief against a pattern of discrimina-
tion in hiring in light of the recent good hiring record of the employer.
26. Like the "adverse impact" definition of discrimination that is identified with the Griggs
case, the "bottom line" principle has been applied in several Supreme Court opinions, the most
recent being United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Thus, the "bottom line" concept
may ultimately be identified as the "Weber principle," just as the "adverse impact" concept is
known as the "Griggs principle."
27. See note 19 supra.
6
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virtually all skilled employees were white, and where there were few
blacks in the pool of available skilled workers.
The company denied that it had discriminated against blacks, al-
though the reason there were so few black skilled workers was a com-
pany policy requiring extensive prior experience as a condition for
skilled employment. This requirement may have been illegal under
Griggs' adverse impact principle,28 but the issue was not litigated be-
cause neither the company, the union, nor the white plaintiff had any
interest in establishing discrimination against blacks.29 Rather, the
company defended the training program on the ground that it was enti-
tled to redress traditional exclusion of blacks from opportunities to ob-
tain skill training-a situation termed "societal discrimination."3  The
lower courts held (a) that the program discriminated on its face by re-
serving positions on the basis of race; (b) that the minorities benefited
had not been the victims of discrimination by the employer, and hence
the program was not "remedial"; and (c) that correcting "societal dis-
crimination" did not justify a program which otherwise violated the
statute.3
The Supreme Court reversed. It held that the program did not dis-
criminate despite the fact that race determined eligibility. The Court
invoked the principle that statutory language should be interpreted in
light of the purpose or "spirit" of the legislation, rather than in a literal
sense. The program was held to be consistent with the purpose of the
statute, which was to include minorities in jobs from which they had
been traditionally excluded.32 Therefore, the plan did not constitute
28. See Weber v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 230 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom,
J., dissenting).
29. In his dissent in Weber P. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., Judge Wisdom pointed out that
the broad prohibition against discrimination places the employer and the union on what he accu-
rately described as a "high tightrope without a net beneath them." Id. Justice Blackmun agreed:
"If Title VII is read literally, on the one hand they face liability for past discrimination against
blacks, and on the other they face liability to whites for any voluntary preferences adopted to
mitigate the effects of prior discrimination against blacks," United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. at 208 (Blackmum, J., concurring). In the district court no party had any incentive to prove
that Kaiser had violated the Act. Weber v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 769
(E.D. La. 1976).
30. Appellants urge this court to approve the on-the-job training ratio not to correct past
employment discrimination . . . but to correct a lack of training blamed on past societal dis-
crimination. For surely it is common knowledge that many blacks (and others) have suffered
arbitrary discrimination in the society, discrimination still producing effects which they carry
with them . ...
Weber v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 225 (5th Cir. 1977).
31. Weber v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 769-70 (E.D. La. 1976); Weber
v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 225-27 (5th Cir. 1977).
32. "Congress' primary concern in enacting the prohibition against racial discrimination in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with 'the plight of the Negro in our economy.' 110
Cong. Rec. 6548 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)." United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 202.
"The purposes of the plan mirror those of the statute. Both were designed to break down old
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy. Both were structured to 'open employment opportu-
7
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illegal discrimination.
The fact that the individuals who benefited were not the victims of
prior discrimination by the employer was not significant in the deci-
sion. In fact, the minorities who benefited under the plan probably
were also the beneficiaries of an earlier affirmative action hiring pro-
gram for unskilled workers which the company had instituted as a re-
sult of informal governmental pressures.33  The rejection of a
requirement that those benefiting under an affirmative action program
be the victims of past employer discrimination left employers free to
adopt programs that include minorities and women without admitting
past discrimination against them or encountering the risk of a reverse
discrimination claim. The opposite result would have severely limited
the ability of the employer to take the kind of affirmative action that
would enable it to achieve "bottom line" results. 34  Weber, however,
was only the most recent Supreme Court decision reflecting the "bot-
tom line" philosophy.
In 1974, the Supreme Court decided its first "bottom line" case, a
case in which the employer had hired large numbers of minorities in
the job for which a minority applicant had applied. In Espinoza v.
Farah Manufacturing Co.,35 the plaintiff claimed discrimination on
grounds of national origin. She was a Mexican-American resident
alien in Texas who had been refused employment because she was not
a United States citizen. She claimed that the citizenship requirement
discriminated against those born outside the United States. The Court
rejected her claim because more than ninety per cent of the employees
in the job for which she had applied were American citizens of Mexi-
can-American ancestry. The "bottom line" showed that there was no
discrimination against Mexican-Americans.
In 1976, in Washington v. Davis,3 6 the employer's good overall record
of recruiting and hiring minorities led the Supreme Court to relax the
standards of the EEOC testing guidelines.37 Washington involved a
test for entry into a police training program. While the test apparently
measured the abilities necessary for the training program itself, there
was no correlation established between success in the training program
nities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them.' 110 Cong. Rec.
6548 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey.)" Id. at 208.
33. Id. at 197-98.
34. "It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of
racial injustice . . . constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-con-
scious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." Id. at 204.
35. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
36. 426 U.S. 229 (1976), discussed in Blumrosen, Developments in Equal Employment Opportu-
nit) Law, 1976, 36 FED. B.J. 55, 61-64 (1977).
37. Although decided under the fifth amendment equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution, the Court addressed the issues under Title VII.
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and success on the job. Therefore, the test did not meet the technical
requirements of the EEOC guidelines.38 Nevertheless, the majority of
the Supreme Court upheld the use of the test.
I believe that several factors influenced this decision. First, the de-
partment had embarked on a major recruiting program,3 9 so that the
proportion of blacks who passed the test, while lower than that of
whites, nevertheless resulted in admission to the training program of
"adequate" numbers of blacks in reference to relevant population
figures. All applicants who were admitted to the training program
"graduated" and became police officers. Thus, the department was in
fact providing substantial minority employment. Second, the test in-
volved reading and writing skills which the Court may have concluded
were sufficiently related to police work.4" Third, the "training pro-
gram" could be viewed as a "job" in its own right. It lasted sixteen
weeks. The "higher level" job which automatically followed was that
of police officer. Under EEOC guidelines in effect then and now, there
is no obligation to test for a higher level job. Such an obligation would
be inconsistent with the purposes of the statute.
In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,4 the Court noted that
the plaintiff could not have sustained a claim of purposeful discrimina-
tion because the Authority employed minorities at a rate double their
availability in the labor force.
In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,4 2 the Court held that the
employer's "good record" of hiring minorities could be introduced as
evidence of a non-discriminatory motive in a case alleging that individ-
ual plaintiffs had been excluded from employment because they were
black. Furnco is the companion case to McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,4 3 which held that evidence of a "bad record" in hiring minori-
ties would be evidence against the employer in an individual case.
Other than Espinoza, Furnco is the clearest "bottom line" case to
reach the Supreme Court. Furnco involved a deliberate affirmative ac-
tion hiring program under which the employer sought to and did em-
ploy a specific proportion of black workers exceeding the proportion of
blacks available in the labor market with the necessary skills. This af-
firmative action plan had been developed after the employer had expe-
rience in prior Title VII litigation. The employer's business consisted
38. The UGESP - 1978 sets out acceptable types of validity studies. UGESP - 1978, 29
C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1978).
39. 426 U.S. at 246.
40. Id. at 252.
41. 440 U.S. 568 n.25 (1979).
42. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
43. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers are Entitled to
"Just Cause" Protection Under Title VI1, 2 INDUSTRIAL REL. L.J. 519 (1978).
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of re-bricking blast furnaces on contract from steel manufacturers in
the Chicago-Gary area. When it obtained a contract, it designated a
permanent employee as supervisor of the job. That employee would
then hire individual workers for the project from among those workers
known to him to be experienced and competent, or recommended to
him as such. The supervisors were white; the persons they hired also
tended to be white. Alone, this practice would constitute a discrimina-
tory hiring system. 4 However, the employer's affirmative action hiring
program directed that a specific proportion of those hired should be
black. These persons were identified by other company personnel. As
a result, Furnco employed black bricklayers in excess of tL ree times
their participation rate in the available labor force.
Three qualified black bricklayers applied "at the gate" for employ-
ment on the project. They were rejected on the ground that no one was
hired at the gate, but only through the process described above. They
brought a Title VII action. The district court found for the employer
on the ground of "business necessity" 45 -that the special skills involved
in the job in question justified the employer in pre-screening employees
and refusing to hire anyone at the plant gate. The court of appeals4 6
reversed on the ground that Title VII precluded an employer from re-
fusing to consider qualified black applicants. The court of appeals,
however, did not find any other specific aspect of the employer's prac-
tice to be discriminatory. The Supreme Court reversed. It rejected the
contention that an employer must always consider qualified black ap-
plicants regardless of the surrounding circumstances. Rather, it noted
that there was no "adverse effect" of the employer hiring practices on
the minorities as a group because the affirmative action program had
resulted in hiring of minorities at a rate substantially above their avail-
ability in the labor pool. This meant that the two hiring practices taken
together-the supervisors' method of selecting employees plus the af-
firmative action program--did not violate Title VII under the "adverse
effect" principle of Griggs.
On this point Justice Marshall dissented.47 He wished to leave open
the question of whether the affirmative action hiring program elimi-
nated the discriminatory taint of what he considered the "primary hir-
ing practice" of employment of whites based on past associations with
the white supervisor. The majority opinion, however, foreclosed that
issue, and thus implicitly adopted the "bottom line" thesis: the law will
look to the overall results of an employer's hiring program, and if they
44. Cf. Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
45. Waters v. Furnco Constr. Co., 13 F.E.P. 1020, 1024 (1975).
46. 551 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir. 1977).
47. 438 U.S. at 583-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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are not illegal, will not inquire into the operation of component parts of
the process.
Concluding that there had been no "adverse impact" found, the ma-
jority then chastised the court of appeals for imposing a remedy
without finding a violation of the statute: "[Clourts may not impose
such a remedy [to consider and hire more qualified minorities] on an
employer at least until a violation of Title VII has been proved, and
here none has been ....
The Court did, however, remand to permit consideration of whether
there had been deliberate purposeful discrimination against any of the
individual applicants. In connection with this remand, the Court di-
rected that the employer be permitted to introduce the results of its
affirmative action hiring program in order to rebut any inference of
purposeful discrimination.
[T]he employer must be allowed some latitude to introduce evidence
which bears on his motive. Proof that his work force was racially bal-
anced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of mi-
nority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when
that issue is yet to be decided.49
Furnco thus illustrates two aspects of the "bottom line" concept. The
results of affirmative action preclude a finding that the hiring practice
has an adverse effect under the Griggs principle. Those same results
may show that an employer has not rejected the particular applicants
because of their race. If an employer is hiring other minorities at the
time it rejects a particular minority, it seems unlikely that the rejection
was based on race, In such circumstances, in the absence of other evi-
dence of purposeful discrimination on the part of the employer, it is
difficult to see how individual plaintiffs could prevail. The deliberate
inclusion of minorities through an affirmative action program will
make it difficult for a trier of fact to believe that other minorities were
rejected on racial grounds5 0°
Thus, in cases based on the "adverse effect" theory, such as Espinoza,
as well as cases based on the "intent" theory of discrimination, such as
Furnco, a good record of minority or female employment may defeat
liability altogether, or become a factor in the court's net judgment as to
whether there was discrimination. The lower courts are also applying
the "bottom line" concept.5
48. Id. at 578.
49. Id. at 580.
50. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 n.25 (1979).
51. Rice v. City of St. Louis, 607 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1979); Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217
(1st Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Navajo Refining Co., 593 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1979); Friend v. Leidinger,
588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978); Hernandez v. Phelps Dodge Refining Co., 572 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir.
1978); Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976); Brown v,
New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Conn. 1979); Hameed v. International Ass'n of
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THE BOTTOM LINE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
In 1966, the EEOC issued a set of "guidelines" expressing its inter-
pretation of Title VII requirements regarding testing which adversely
affects minority employment opportunity. The underlying theory of
the guidelines was that unless the tests had been validated-that is, un-
less there was a demonstrated relationship between success on the test
and success in job performance-the tests were not "professionally de-
veloped" as the term was used in Title VII. The guidelines were rela-
tively simple. Thereafter, EEOC and the Department of Labor, Office
of Federal Contract Compliance issued more extensive guidelines on
the subject." In 1971, the Supreme Court upheld the basic EEOC in-
terpretation of Title VII in the Griggs case. 3
In 1972, various federal agencies set out to harmonize technical dif-
ferences between the EEOC, the Labor Department, and the Civil
Service Commission. After a four year gestation period, the result was
a governmental nightmare.54 Three agencies-Justice, Labor, and
Civil Service-issued new guidelines called the Federal Executive
Agency Guidelines (hereinafter referred to as FEA).55 EEOC repub-
lished its 1970 guidelines, which differed in certain respects from the
FEA, including the approach to the "bottom line" issue. 6 The FEA
guidelines adopted an approach that examined the end result of an em-
ployer's hiring or promotion process to determine if there was adverse
impact. If there was no adverse impact, normally there would be no
enforcement action, even if one component of the process, such as a
test, did have adverse impact. The EEOC guidelines were interpreted
informally as taking the opposite view. If any component of a selection
process had adverse impact, it had to be validated, regardless of
whether the remainder of the process cancelled out the adverse effect of
the component. The differences between the agencies can be illustrated
by a simple example:
APPLICANTS PASSED TEST PASSED INTERVIEW HIRED
White 50 30 20 6
Black 50 10 7 6
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local Union No. 396, 24 F.E.P. 352 (8th Cir.
1980); Abercrombie v. Bi-Lo Corp., 21 F.E.P. 1252 (D.S.C. 1979); EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, 24
F.E.P. 7 (3rd Cir. 1980).
52. For discussion of the 1966 and 1970 EEOC testing guidelines, see Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971), and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430-36 (1975).
Guidelines discussed in Moody are found in 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1974).
53. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
54. See generally, Rubin, The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures: Com-
promises and Controversies, 28 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 605, 608-10 (1979).
55. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,734, 51,735 (Dept. of Justice), 51,744 (Dept. of Labor), 51,752 (Civil
Service Comm'n) (1976).
56. Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 41 Fed. Reg. 51,984 (1976) (codified in 29
C.F.R. § 1607).
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Under the approach of the EEOC guidelines, the test resulted in an
adverse effect on minorities because it screened out a higher proportion
(80%) of them, than of whites (40%). Therefore, it would have to be
validated. Under the FEA guidelines approach, the test would not
have to be validated because there was no overall adverse impact. The
same proportion of minority applicants were hired (12%) as were
whites (12%).
The nightmare of government, inconsistency proved short-lived. In
1978, disputes between the agencies were resolved in the Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures-1978 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as UGESP).57 UGESP adopted the "bottom line" philosophy
of the FEA guidelines as a matter of prosecutorial and administrative
discretion. 58 Thus, on the "bottom line" issue, the regulatory agencies
reached the same result as the Supreme Court had reached in Furnco,
albeit as a matter of the exercise of discretion,5 9 rather than as an inter-
pretation of the statute.
UGESP invites an employer to eliminate the adverse impact of a
selection procedure rather than to validate it.6" Sections 3,61 4,62 and
663 of the Guidelines make clear that if an employer eliminates the
adverse effect of employment practices for a job by placing minorities
and women in it at a rate close to the rate at which white males are
placed, it need not validate the selection procedure. The employer who
takes that action will probably not be prosecuted by the government
under Title VII or the Executive Order prohibiting discrimination by
government contractors. 64
Another consideration makes the "bottom line" approach attractive,
if not essential, to employers in connection with the review of their se-
lection procedures under Title VII. It has been my experience that
57. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1978).
58. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
59. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4C (1978).
60. Absent adverse impact, there is no Title VII violation under the Griggs principle. See
EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, 24 F.E.P. 7 (3rd Cir. 1980).
61. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3, EEOC determines that a procedure having adverse impact
constitutes discrimination unless justified by a business necessity.
62. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4A and 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4B, the EEOC requires keeping records
that would disclose adverse impact. Records must be kept on sex, race, and ethnic groups. 29
C.F.R. § 1607.4C explains that although individual components of the selection procedure show
adverse impact, only if the total selection process results in adverse impact will validation be
required. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D adopts the "four-fifths" or "eighty per cent" rule. See note 7
supra.
63. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.6 describes how alternative selection procedures can be used to elimi-
nate adverse impact or how an employer can use an affirmative action program to eliminate ad-
verse impact rather than validate under the UGESP - 1978.
64. UGESP - 1978, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4C (1978).
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most selection and promotion decisions, particularly for jobs which in-
volve the exercise of some discretion, involve an irreducable compo-
nent of subjective judgment. Yet, the reliance on subjective judgments
may include components of conscious or unconscious discrimination.65
Where subjective judgments have adverse impact, the system which re-
lies on them is presumptively illegal. In such cases, the courts will re-
quire the employer to establish "objective standards" in order to reduce
the scope for discrimination.66 This requirement not only eliminates
possible discrimination, it also reduces the scope for the legitimate ex-
ercise of subjective judgments. Virtually the only way an employer can
retain the flexibility to make subjective judgments is by meeting the
"bottom line" standards. In this way, the employer will avoid scrutiny
of its practices under the strict standards of Title VII. This is a power-
ful incentive to the employer to meet the bottom line standard and to
retain its freedom of decisionmaking.
If the employer chooses to validate its procedures. rather than to
achieve "bottom line" results, the UGESP contains detailed rules con-
cerning validation.67 The existence of this combination of professional
standards and legal requirements for violation of selection
prodcedures 68 poses practical problems that may lead an employer to
conclude that it is easier to "switch than fight" to preserve selection
procedures that may have adverse effects.
In addition to the UGESP, the EEOC has adopted guidelines in-
tended to protect employers who take affirmative action from liability
for "reverse" discrimination claims. 69 These guidelines antedated the
decision in Weber,7" and provide an additional element of protection,
and hence incentive, to an employer who wishes to increase its minority
and female employment.
These guidelines differ in one important aspect from all previous
EEOC guidelines. All previous guidelines represented EEOC's inter-
pretation of the statute, and as such were entitled to "deference" by the
courts. The courts remained free to disagree with EEOC guidelines,
and, on occasion, did so.7 Thus, reliance on EEOC guidelines was a
speculative venture. The EEOC affirmative action guidelines have re-
65. See, e.g., Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
66. Id.
67. The UGESP - 1978 requirements are highly technical and complex. See UGESP - 1978,
29 C.F.R. § 1607.5B-.5C (1978).
68. UGESP - 1978, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5C (1978).
69. Affirmative Action Appropriate Under Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 29 C.F.R. § 1608 (1979).
70. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), applies where there are traditionally
segregated jobs. The EEOC Guidelines apply in situations where traditional segregation is not
present. See 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4 (1979).
71. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
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duced or eliminated that risk. While they constitute the EEOC's inter-
pretation of the statute, they go further and invoke the "save harmless"
provision of Title VII, section 713(b).72 Under this section, which has
never been invoked by the EEOC in a general way, employers and
others who act in "good faith, in reliance upon and in conformity with"
the guidelines, cannot be found in violation of Title VII, even if the
EEOC interpretation is later rejected by the courts.
To invoke the affirmative action guidelines, an employer needs to
conduct an analysis of his employment practices73 that may suggest ac-
tual or potential "adverse effect," the present effects of prior discrimi-
natory practices, or a pool of available workers which was limited as a
result of prior discriminatory practices. The employer need not admit
prior discrimination. 74 After such an analysis, the employer may adopt
a reasonable affirmative action program, including "goals and timeta-
bles" 75 without risking "reverse discrimination" liability. The guide-
lines cover areas of affirmative action that go beyond the Weber
decision's emphasis on including minorities in "traditionally segregated
jobs. ' 76  Thus, they contribute to the freedom of the employer to
achieve an acceptable "bottom line" while retaining a substantial de-
gree of flexibility in decisionmaking.
The most recent development in this area is a resolution of April 1,
1980, by the EEOC, adopting a new approach to employers and unions
who address problems of discrimination through the collective bargain-
ing process.77 EEOC has indicated that it will take the "good faith" of
the employer or union into account in "investigation, conciliation and
enforcement" activities. The resolution suggests a case-by-case evalua-
tion of the action of each party in collective bargaining to determine
whether it did "enough" in the bargaining process to achieve essen-
72. In any action or proceeding based on any alleged unlawful employment practice, no
person shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on account of (1) the commission
by such person of an unlawful employment practice if he pleads and proves that the act or
omission complained of was in good faith, in conformity with, and in reliance on any written
interpretation or opinion of the Commission. . . . Such a defense, if established, shall be a
bar to the action or proceeding, notwithstanding that (A) after such act or omission, such
interpretation or opinion is modified or rescinded or is determined by judicial authority to be
invalid or of no legal effect ....
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, § 713(b), 78 Stat. 265 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b)
(1976)).
73. "An affirmative action plan ... shall contain three elements: a reasonable self analysis,
a reasonable basis for concluding action is appropriate, and reasonable action." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1608.4 (1979). "The objective of a self-analysis is to determine whether the employment prac-
tices do, or tend to, exclude, disadvantage, restrict, or result in adverse impact or disparate treat-
ment . . . or leave uncorrected the effects of prior discrimination .. " Id. § 1608.4A.
74. "It is not necessary that the self analysis establish a violation of Title VII" before a plan
can be put into effect. ld. § 1608.4B.
75. Id. § 1608.4C.
76. Id. § 1608.3A-.3C.
77. [1980] 103 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 304.
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tially "bottom line" results, or whether it was a recalcitrant party seek-
ing to maintain discriminatory practices.
SOME SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE "BOTTOM LINE" APPROACH
Thus, both the Supreme Court and the federal agencies have moved
toward the concept that the purpose of the law can be directly served
by employer race and sex specific action to increase minority and fe-
male employment. In such actions, percentages, numbers, goals, and
timetables may be used.7" It is implicit in this analysis that the persons
benefited by such programs need not themselves have been "identifi-
able victims" of discrimination, so long as they are members of the
groups which have been discriminated against. The Weber decision
makes this point in its rejection of the court of appeals' analysis. That
court would have permitted affirmative action only to the extent that it
provided redress for victims of prior discrimination.79 But this was not
the situation in Weber. In fact, the unskilled black workers who bene-
fited from the affirmative action training program may have been bene-
ficiaries of an earlier affirmative action hiring program designed to
increase the number of unskilled black workers."0 If so, they were
twice blessed by affirmative action. This fact did not deter the Supreme
Court from upholding the training program. Thus, Weber overcomes a
major barrier to the "voluntary" use of "quota remedies." The imposi-
tion of such remedies by courts and agencies can be expected in the
future with greater frequency where the employer has not adopted and
implemented a "bottom line" philosophy.
One issue that must be resolved in applying the "bottom line" ap-
proach is "how much is enough." How do we know if the "bottom
line" has been satisfied? As a general principle, the bottom line for a
job category should be set at that point which, if implemented gener-
ally, will have a significant effect on the three indices of employment
discrimination: unemployment rates, occupational distribution, and in-
come ratios. It must be achievable; hence, availability of candidates is
a necessary consideration.
Hazelwood School District v. United States"l suggests that the appro-
priate standard is the distribution of opportunities which would occur
in the long run absent discrimination. This distribution would include
minorities and women throughout the relevant labor force in rough ap-
proximation to their proportions in the population. This, however, is
78. 29 C.F.R. § 16084C (1978).
79. Weber v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'dsub nom.
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979).
80. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
81. 433 U.S. 299, 305 (1977).
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not to be understood as a rule requiring proportional representation in
each employment situation.82 Rather, it is a general standard by which
we may determine when society has "done enough" in the field of em-
ployment opportunity. The application of this standard to specific
cases will require a high degree of sensitivity centered around two
fairly simple points.
First, in the absence of a showing of discriminatory purpose, Title
VII comes into play only when there is "adverse impact." This is the
lesson of Furnco."3 Absent such impact, the courts should not meddle
in employer hiring practices under Title VII. Second, adverse impact is
a legal, not a statistical, concept.8 4 The UGESP uses a "rule of thumb"
to identify adverse impact, which involves finding that the rates of hire
or promotion of minorities are less than eighty per cent of that of non-
minorities."5 Thus, in the illustration used above, the test did have ad-
verse impact, while the interview did not.
This "rule of thumb" is an understandable and relatively simple
method of identifying when the statutory obligations attach. It uses
facts that are easily ascertainable and are understandable to those who
must administer and review such programs. The argument that the
standard should be "statistical significance" rather than the "eighty per
cent rule of thumb" not only would require all employers to acquire
statistical competence, but-more fundamentally-it misconceives the
function of the principle of adverse impact. Adverse impact is a legal
concept which has been defined by the Supreme Court in cases from
Griggs8 6 to Beazer.87
Statistical significance is not necessary to establish adverse impact.
Adverse impact can be identified by a simple inspection of the differ-
ences in the number of males compared to females or the number of
blacks compared to whites. Rather, evidence of statistical significance
may be used defensively to show that factors other than race or sex
were responsible for the adverse impact.88 If statistical significance
were required to prove adverse impact, a plaintiff would have to ex-
clude all reasons other than race or sex as a part of the prima facie case.
This would destroy the legal function of the adverse impact principle,
which is to require the defendant to explain or to justify apparent re-
strictions on minority or female opportunity. The "eighty per cent
82. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977).
83. Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). See text accompanying notes 42-51
supra.
84. See discussion note 7 supra.
85. Id.
86. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
87. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
88. See Finklestein, Judicial Reception of Multiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex Dis-
crimination Cases, 80 CAL. L. REV. 737 (1980).
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rule" of the UGESP is a practical device used to identify situations
where an explanation should be produced by an employer.
The "eighty per cent rule" requires a comparison between two situa-
tions: "before" and "after." Thus, it will work to compare applicants
with "hires," or those employed with those promoted. However, it will
not work in connection with recruiting of employees because the size of
the pool of available persons generally is not known. This uncertainty
leads to interminable conflicts about the size of the pool of "available"
persons. If the pool is defined in a limited way, then the pool may "dry
up." If it is defined as the labor force as a whole,89 then the employer's
obligation may become more extensive than can be achieved.
It is my view that the determination of availability should not be so
refined as to cause the pool of candidates to disappear, but neither
should it impose an impossible burden on the employer. These objec-
tives can be met by utilizing the categories of employment which the
federal government has developed and administered for more than
fifteen years.9" By now, virtually all jobs have been slotted into one of
the ten occupational categories on which all employers of one hundred
or more employees are required to report annually to the EEOC.9 '
Availability should be based on the existing utilization rates of other
employers in the same general job category. For example, if all em-
ployers in a given area employ minorities in a certain job category at a
level of thirty per cent, as revealed by EEOC data, such information
would establish the existence of a qualified labor pool in the area. This
approach will provide a ready answer to questions of availability,
which, when coupled with the operation of the "eighty per cent rule,"
will assure that only the employer with serious underutilization will be
targeted under Title VII. EEOC data of the type described can be
made readily available without identifying individual employers. 92
This would eliminate the technical advantages which wealthy employ-
ers may obtain through the use of high caliber specialists, and would
reduce the cost of administering the programs to the government.
Once adverse effect has been established, a remedy using specific
goals and timetables is now appropriate,93 reserving specific propor-
tions of positions to minorities or women. This remedy may remain in
effect until the employer has reached the level of participation expected
89. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), general popula-
tion statistics were held determinative of whether enough minorities had been hired as truck driv-
ers. However, in Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), the Court looked
to a more limited pool of teachers where specialized skills were required.
90. See EEOC REPORT No. 1, supra note 4, at xv.
91. See I EEOC 1978 REPORT, supra note 4, at 1-686.
92. Id. at IX.
93. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4C (1978). The discussion in text assumes that the employer has no
other defenses.
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of an employer who has made a positive contribution to equal employ-
ment opportunity-so that the employer's minority and female partici-
pation rates would be above the average.94 Under this approach, the
employer who "comes close" to meeting the "bottom line" standard
would be "let alone," while the employer who did not, would feel the
full burden of the law until it had made this positive contribution to
equal employment opportunity.
The bottom line concept must be applied separately to each job
group. Otherwise, the purpose of the statute could be defeated by plac-
ing many minorities and women in jobs which had been traditionally
reserved to them.95
Once a goal has been established, the courts now seem more willing
to reserve specific percentages of the job vacancies for minorities or
women until the goal has been reached, following the formula adopted
in the Weber case.96
The present Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs' (here-
inafter referred to as OFCCP) approach to the "bottom line" is more
mechanical than that suggested here or that applied under Title VII.
Under the statute, as interpreted, a "gross disparity" between employ-
ment and availability establishes a prima facie case of discrimination in
recruitment and hiring.97 Remedial action in such a case may include
goals aimed at achieving a level of employment based on availability.98
Under the OFCCP approach, an employer missing the availability goal
by one person must adopt a goal of increasing its minority or female
employment by one.99 Thus, there exists a difference in the underlying
approaches of Title VII and the Executive Order program, in that the
Executive Order program would require "affirmative action" of con-
tractors in situations where the Title VII approach would leave the em-
ployer alone because its employment pattern did not rise to the level of
a "gross" disparity.
While the OFCCP Compliance Manual suggests that an employer
must not only set goals if it is short of the availability level by one
person, but also must come within ninety-five per cent of meeting its
goals,'o we can hope that the Order will not be enforced in a mechani-
cal fashion. In terms of allocation of scarce enforcement resources and
94. This "average" could be established through a consideration of relevant EEOC statistics.
95. This view is adopted in 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4C (1978). See note 9 supra. This view is also
implicit in Fumco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 568 (1978).
96. See text accompanying notes 27-34 supra.
97. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
98. Id.; Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979).
99. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.12(1) (1979), as interpreted in OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLI-
ANCE PROGRAMS, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 2.190.1 (1979).
100. Id.
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of avoidance of complex legal problems of the relation between Title
VII and the Executive Order, it makes more sense for the Department
of Labor to focus its enforcement efforts in situations where it can es-
tablish a violation of both Title VII and the Order, rather than address-
ing the "marginal" case under the Executive Order.
CONCLUSION
The "bottom line" principle will be a central legal and industrial re-
lations issue of the 1980's. It is an important tool in implementing the
anti-discrimination law because it suggests that the allocation of jobs
on the basis of race or sex under the threat of government supervision
need not continue into the indefinite future. Once the bottom line is
"satisfied," employers should be free to operate personnel systems on
principles which do not take into account race or sex. This does not
mean that the employer may return to its traditional patterns of restric-
tion or exclusion of minorities or women. In order to satisfy the "bot-
tom line" standard, the employer will have brought minorities and
women into its employment in significant numbers. Their presence will
provide assurance that the employment system will thereafter operate
to include those who have previously been excluded without the need
for formal quotas, either voluntarily adopted or governmentally im-
posed.
Recruitment practices such as "word of mouth" notification of va-
cancies from incumbent employees to their friends, which excluded mi-
norities when the work force was all or largely white, will include them
as minorities make up an increasing part of the work force. I°" Thus,
the bottom line principle envisions a time when race or sex conscious
programs can be reduced or eliminated because the industrial relations
system operates autonomously in a fair way.' 0 2 It may enable our soci-
ety to implement the underlying principles of Title VII without creating
a system which permanently allocates employment on the basis of race
or sex.
101. In discussing this approach in an article concerning the duty of fair recruitment, I hy-
pothesized that minority employment would reach a "take off point" where special programs
would no longer be necessary. See A. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 218-70
(1971).
102. The Supreme Court in Weber laid a foundation for discontinuing such programs after an
appropriate level of minority participation had been established by distinguishing between pro-
grams which "eliminate" racial imbalance and those which "maintain" racial balance. The Court
suggested that a program of the latter type might not be protected under Title VII. United Steel-
workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). The temporary nature of the set aside of 10% of
certain federal construction contract funds for minority contractors was a factor contributing to
the holding in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2779 (1980), that the program was constitu-
tional.
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